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Since the early 1960’s, Cuba and China have won international appreciation by
sending doctors abroad to help where they are needed. While there was surprise in
some quarters when U.S. military personnel were deployed to combat Ebola in the last
months of 2014, the Department of Defense actually has a long history of medical
activity. In its current form, DoD medical outreach cannot likely garner soft power in
the way that the Chinese and Cuban programs can, but with a few modifications, the
U.S. military could be a serious conductor of medical diplomacy that would save
countless lives and benefit the image of America abroad.

Executive Summary
Since Harvard’s Joseph Nye first introduced the concept, Soft Power has been
the definition of a country’s ability to influence the action of other countries without
the use of military threats or economic inducements. Although the concept of soft
power was not formally introduced to the field of international relations until the early
1990’s, civilizations from Ancient Rome to Ancient China have for millennia
conducted activities geared toward increasing what would be called soft power by
modern scholars of International Relations. In recent years, countries have
increasingly sought soft power through a variety of methods, the sources of soft power
primarily falling into three categories: cultural appreciation, the political values a
country demonstrates at home, and the way in which its foreign policy is perceived.
China, for example, has built hundreds of “Confucius Institutes” in foreign countries
aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture. Japan has gained soft power from
the appeal of its cultural exports from anime to Hello Kitty. Many countries have
invested significant resources in obtaining soft power through foreign aid.
Despite an uptick in world opinion of the United States after the election of
President Obama, the general trend line appears to be down, according to Joseph Nye,
the conceptual grandfather of soft power. The United States has historically enjoyed
vast soft power resources. Despite revelations about domestic spying and other
infringements on personal liberty, the famous quote used by several Presidents
describing the America as a “shining city on a hill” remains somewhat true; the United
States undoubtedly remains the world’s most famous democracy. American
television, music and other aspects of popular culture are more prolific now than they
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have perhaps ever been. Despite those apparent advantages, however, America’s
image in the world is less positive than it once was. The proliferation of American
cultural products elicits accusations of cultural imperialism, and America’s foreign
policy (without making a value judgment about its merits), especially under President
George W. Bush, has often been received negatively. Although there have been some
improvements in this regard under President Obama, who at least pays much more lipservice to the idea of soft power than did his predecessor, the record of his
administration has been mixed. Some necessarily combative actions (the drone
program, for example) and some foreign policy blunders (ignoring the Green
Movement in Iran, abandoning red lines in Syria, and the failure of any high-level
members of the Administration to attend the march in Paris following the attack by
Islamic extremists on Charlie Hebdo, to name a few) have damaged President
Obama’s image – and, by extension, that of the United States – abroad.
The world is not becoming any less complicated, and it is likely that the United
States will continue to be forced to conduct a foreign policy that is at times unpopular.
In recognition of this reality, it becomes necessary to explore additional measures to
strengthen American soft power. One way in which the United States might do this is
to co-opt and adapt a form of outreach commonly referred to as “medical diplomacy,”
which is extensively and effectively employed especially by two countries – Cuba and
China – with which America has often been at odds. By expanding and further
utilizing the medical resources of the Department of Defense, the United States could
save countless lives abroad, and win appreciation in the international community.
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Medical internationalism has been central to Cuba’s foreign policy since the
early 1960’s. Since the program began, over 100,000 Cuban medical personnel have
practiced in over 100 countries. In recent years, Cuban medical teams have provided
medical assistance in the wake of most of the world’s major disasters, taking a leading
role, for example, in combatting Ebola in western Africa. The Cubans have also done
pioneering work in medical education, establishing or teaching in numerous foreign
medical institutions. Cuba also established the Latin American School of Medicine
(ELAM), which has provided free medical education to students from poor
communities around the world, including some from the United States.
Cuba’s medical diplomacy has been quite effective at improving relations with
recipient countries, and has elevated the country on the international stage. Individual
countries with negative views toward Cuba have changed their tune after receiving
Cuban medical assistance, and Cuba’s medical activity has often garnered favor with
the United Nations and other international institutions. Cuba’s efforts have even
resonated in the United States, where high-ranking officials praised Cuban efforts to
combat Ebola, and President Obama (for a variety of reasons extending beyond just
Cuba’s medical activity) has taken steps to restore full diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Medical diplomacy has also had commercial benefits for Cuba, which receives
compensation from some of the countries it services, as well as the opportunity to
export its medical products to health markets Cuban activity helped to improve.
Although Cuban health outreach does not operate perfectly – there is, for example,
sometimes backlash from local medical practitioners who resent competition – it has
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undoubtedly worked in Cuba’s favor, and constitutes a resounding foreign policy
success for this small communist country.
China began a medical outreach program in the early 1960’s around the same
time as the Cubans. Vastly larger than Cuba, China deploys doctors to its client
countries, primarily in Africa, on a province-by-province basis. Like Cuba, China has
established medical training programs abroad. Although China does not operate an
international medical school on the scale of Cuba’s ELAM, the PRC does host a
substantial number of international students, and aims to increase that number as part
of an overall strategy to obtain soft power. Medical outreach has also benefited the
Chinese pharmaceutical industry, which has worked hard to promote their product in a
variety of ways, including sending it abroad with Chinese medical teams.
China’s soft power efforts have sometimes been undermined by parallel and
complicating economic activity, or by instances in which counterfeit medication
believed to be from China has harmed patients (although these drugs were not
necessarily furnished by Chinese medical teams). Despite setbacks like this, Chinese
medical diplomacy is quite popular with the countries they serve. African leaders
promote the medical cooperation as a clear benefit to their countries, and most of those
countries either help pay for or cover entirely the full range of expenses for the
maintaining Chinese medical support.
Although the Cuban and Chinese programs are by far the most prominent
examples of direct medical diplomacy, other countries have engaged in similar
activity. Peacekeeping troops of various nationalities have often cared for patients in a
way that almost certainly garners soft power. The United States military has
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sometimes conducted medical outreach that could potentially result in soft power
generation, although these activities are usually conducted under the auspices of
stability operations rather than direct medical diplomacy. As Ebola spread unchecked
across western Africa in the summer and fall of 2014, for example, the U.S. military
(partly at the request of Doctors Without Borders) was a key player in the international
effort to stop the virus.
While many were taken aback by what they considered to be the
unprecedented involvement of the United States military in a global health campaign,
the DoD and its predecessors have, in fact, a long history of medical activity. In
addition to domestic medical activity like research and preparation for potential
biological threats, the military has often cared for foreign patients in addition to
American military casualties. This has often taken the form of disaster relief, or
efforts to win over local populations in the context of counterinsurgencies, like in the
Philippines, Vietnam and Afghanistan. These operations and other medical outreach
conducted by the military usually take the form of stability operations, which are
aimed at preventing instability (of the sort that exists in places like Somalia), which,
the DoD believes, can produce threats such as terrorism.
Much of the U.S. military’s medical outreach does not translate to an effective
medical diplomacy program like the ones run by Cuba and China—the current ability
of the DoD to gain soft power via medical diplomacy is impeded by variety of factors,
some of which are technical problems. Although the military conducts widespread
medical activity, some of which is done with and for foreigners, this activity is ad hoc,
lacking any deliberate central coordination. This sometimes complicates medical
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operations on the ground, hindering the coordination of medical efforts both within
different branches of the government and with nongovernmental organizations.
In addition to technical issues that undermine the DoD’s ability to conduct
medical diplomacy, there are some aspects of U.S. military medical activity that are
problems more specifically in a medical diplomacy context. That the military medical
corps is so dedicated to preserving resources for potential American casualties – even
at times when it is extremely unlikely that there will be any – conveys an image of
stinginess and indifference that is not conducive to soft power generation. Military
medical operations have also frequently been plagued by missteps grounded in a poor
understanding of local culture as it pertains to medical practice. Also, unlike in the
case of the Chinese and Cuban medical diplomacy programs, U.S. military medical
outreach is frequently very short term, making it difficult to build serious relationships
between American doctors and their foreign communities in a way that could bolster
America’s image abroad.
If its medical activity were modified and expanded, the United States
Department of Defense could become an effective conductor of medical diplomacy
that could garner significant soft power for the United States. The following
recommendations are one way in which some of these issues could potentially be
addressed.
•

The military should expand medical outreach activities that specifically take
the form of medical diplomacy, rather than just stability operations.

•

Congress should dedicate clearer funding for operations that would allow
greater flexibility.
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•

To streamline the function of military medical outreach activity, the DoD
should appoint a single coordinator to manage foreign medical activity (with
sub-positions for various fields as necessary).

•

Steps should be taken to improve coordination with outside organizations that
play a role in health operations.

•

Military medical personnel abroad (through training and doctrinal changes)
should be discouraged from treating foreign patients as less important than
Americans and from giving the appearance of hoarding medical resources,
except in cases where U.S. personnel urgently require those resources. Along
similar lines, the complex decision as to whether foreign patients should
receive the highest standard of care or merely the local standard must be
tailored to the circumstances of operations on a case-by-case basis.

•

Increase the length of deployments to allow American doctors to truly connect
with foreign populations in a way that could foster understanding and build
relationships. One way to facilitate this is by creating bilateral relations with
foreign medical institutions, which could include opening the Uniformed
Services University of Health Sciences to foreign students even if they did not
attend undergraduate school at an American institution.

These recommendations will not create a medical diplomacy program on the scale of
the Chinese or Cuban programs – nor should that necessarily be the goal. These
changes, though, could allow the United States to gain soft power from the hitherto
largely untapped diplomatic resource of the military medical corps.
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Intro: Soft Power
Soft power, says Harvard’s Joseph Nye, is the ability of a state to get what it
wants from other states without directly employing carrots or sticks. While no terms
describing soft power existed before Nye coined the phrase in 1990, political units
throughout history have availed themselves of means besides direct inducement or
coercion to reach their goals. The economic and military might of the Roman Empire
was undeniable, but it also gained influence simply by being admired by outsiders.
Chinese Admiral Zheng He’s travels during the fifteenth century showcased the power
of Chinese civilization, earning it respect from and relations with other nations.1
While the Marshall Plan was a direct economic investment in the rebuilding of
Western Europe in the wake of WWII, it was more than just a payoff in exchange for
European loyalty. It bolstered pro-American sentiment and encouraged opposition to
the spread of Soviet Communism. Countless other historical examples of soft power
prior to its naming abound, and since Nye clarified its existence in 1990, it has become
a core concept of international relations.
Soft power is interpreted in a variety of ways. It is achieved, according to
former Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, “when other nations admire and
want to emulate aspects of that nation’s civilization.”2 Nye believes that there are two
other resources in addition to cultural appreciation from which soft power can be
acquired: The political values a country demonstrates at home, and the way in which
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Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’”
Survival, Vol. 48 No. 2 (Summer 2006). Pg. 18. Available:
http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/0606gill.pdf
2
Lam Pin Foo, “Only the Tang Dynasty Came Close to Having Influence,” The
Straights Times, October 26, 1996.
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its foreign policy is perceived.3 The way in which countries draw on these potential
sources of soft power varies, as some countries emphasize different strengths. A
country with a widely admired culture but a comparatively weak foreign policy, for
example, would draw more of its soft power from its cultural appeal.
Many if not most state actors appear to share Nye’s belief that they “have, can
and should continue to find ways to effectively develop and use this power resource.”4
In 2007, China’s then-President Hu Jintao identified soft power as a policy priority,
and the People’s Republic has launched massive efforts at its acquisition since. As
other countries like France, Germany and the United Kingdom have also done, China
since 2004 has built a network of schools abroad, known as Confucius Institutes.
These schools, aimed at promoting appreciation for Chinese language and culture,
exist in over a hundred countries; the stated goal is to increase the current number
(over 350) to a thousand by 2020.5 Other countries also rely heavily on appreciation
for their culture to gain soft power—Japanese pop cultural exports like anime and
Hello Kitty, for example, have gained a significant following outside Japan.6 Some
countries have invested significant resources in soft power through foreign aid. The
United Arab Emirates in 2013 committed 1.25 percent of its Gross National Income
(GNI) to foreign aid, giving the highest percent of any country in the world, followed
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Joseph Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power,” Foreign Policy,
April 29, 2013. Available:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get
_about_soft_power#trending
4
Mattern (2005), 588.
5
Dustin Roasa, “China’s Soft Power Surge,” Foreign Policy, November 18, 2012.
Available:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/18/chinas_soft_power_surge
6
“Japan’s Soft Power: Squaring the Cool,” The Economist, June 16, 2014. Available:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/06/japans-soft-power
11

by Norway and Sweden (it should be noted that the United States gave more than any
country in the world in terms of actual dollar amount).7 China has also launched
massive direct aid programs, especially in Africa, ranging from infrastructure
construction to medical diplomacy. “While aid from OECD countries stagnates or
shrinks under the pressure of budgets and an increasingly skeptical public,” say Claire
Provost and Richard Harris, “a host of new emerging donors – including Brazil,
Venezuela, and Iran – are expanding their work in other developing countries.”8
The United States has traditionally enjoyed vast reserves of soft power.
“America’s global domination,” says Matthew Fraser in Weapons of Mass Distraction,
“has been achieved through largely non-military means.” 9 The United States is
almost certainly the world’s most famous democracy, a fact widely admired in a world
where democracy is generally considered a good thing (or at least, as Winston
Churchill famously implied, the least bad option). American values and popular
culture have also historically been a tremendous soft power resource. During the
Second World War, says Fraser, “Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck conducted
Disneyland diplomacy to spread American values throughout the world.”10 The power
of American culture has only increased since. American television is “watched daily
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Joshua Keating, “Rich Countries Got More Generous Last Year,” Slate, April 9,
2014. Available:
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/04/09/new_oecd_figures_the_surprising
_country_that_gives_the_most_foreign_aid.html
8
Claire Provost and Rich Harris, “China commits billions in aid to Africa as part of
charm offensive,” The Guardian, April 29, 2013. Available:
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/interactive/2013/apr/29/chinacommits-billions-aid-africa-interactive
9
Matthew Fraser, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire
(Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003). Pg. 10.
10
Fraser (2003), 9.
12

in virtually every corner of the earth where TV sets can be found,”11 and American
pop-stars have found receptive audiences from Indonesia to Africa. American
products from Nike shoes to iPhones are sought after in most of the world. Kentucky
Fried Chicken has opened a restaurant in Tiananmen Square, and at Disneyland in
Paris, “café intellectuals drink Coca-Cola while railing against American ‘cultural
imperialism.’”12
During the twenty-first century, however, the United States has seen a decline
in its soft power, which Nye attributes in large part (citing polling data) to its foreign
policy.13 Some dismiss this decline, noting that the United States has recovered in the
past from ill will brought on by foreign policy decisions. The recent decline, however,
should not be dismissed on the same basis, since, as Nye points out, “that was against
the backdrop of the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as
the greater evil.”14 This decline seems to be especially pronounced among young
people. Although young people widely admire American pop culture, Nye says, “the
unpopularity of our foreign policy decisions is causing the next generation to question
American power.”15 Problems in one of the three areas of potential soft power
generation can undermine the other sources of soft power – the unpopularity of U.S.
foreign policy sometimes leads to declining interest in American culture and products
as well.16 Although American popularity abroad improved after the election of
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Fraser (2003), 10-11.
Fraser (2003), 10.
13
Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” in
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 2, 2004. Pg. 255.
14
Nye (2004), 257.
15
Nye (2004), 256.
16
Fraser (2004), 12.
12
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President Obama17 – who certainly pays greater lip service to soft power than did his
predecessor – the record of his administration is mixed. Some necessarily combative
actions (like the drone program, and various other military actions) combined with
some foreign policy blunders (like ignoring the Green Movement in Iran and skipping
the march in Paris following the attack by Islamic extremists on Charlie Hebdo, to
name a few) have damaged President Obama’s standing – and by extension, that of the
United States – abroad.
Despite some improvement in America’s image after President Obama’s
ascendency, and the widespread foreign appreciation for American popular culture, it
is likely that America will continue to be forced in the future to conduct an aggressive
foreign policy that is at times unpopular. The United States, thus, must look for more
opportunities to garner soft power. One way in which America could do this is to coopt and adapt a form of outreach used especially extensively by Cuba and China, two
countries with which America admittedly shares very little. By expanding and further
utilizing the medical resources of the Department of Defense, the United States could
save countless lives abroad, and win appreciation in the international community by
conducting what is commonly referred to as “medical diplomacy.”

17

“Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World,” Pew Research Center,
July 23, 2009. Available: http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/07/23/confidence-inobama-lifts-us-image-around-the-world/
14

Overview of Cuba and China’s Medical Diplomacy Programs
Cuba
A specific focus on medicine has been a substantial part of Cuba’s postrevolutionary political philosophy. “From the outset of the revolution,” says Julie
Feinsilver, Fidel Castro “made the health of the individual a metaphor for the health of
the body politic.” This focus on healthcare by the Cuban government is obvious
domestically—between 1970 and 2005, the number of Cuban healthcare workers
tripled, the ratio of doctors to population moved from one doctor per 1,393 people to
one per 159.18 As a result, Cuba’s domestic healthcare system is far superior to other
developing nations, and their healthcare outcomes often rival even some of the world’s
most advanced countries. Life expectancy in Cuba, for example, is the same as it is in
the United States, and infant mortality is actually lower on this small Caribbean island
than it is in the world’s most powerful country.19
Cuba’s focus on healthcare is also obvious in its medical diplomacy program.
Castro’s government began what was initially an ad hoc program of medical
internationalism soon after their revolution. According to John Kirk, the early stages
of the program were a series of responses to emergencies abroad, assistance given
without consideration of cost or benefit.20 Cuba dispatched medical resources to Chile
in the wake of a major earthquake there in 1960 and sent doctors to Algeria several
years later during the mass-exodus of medical professionals there. As the program has

18

Julie Feinsilver, “Cuban Medical Diplomacy: When The Left Has Got It Right,”
Counsel on Hemispheric Affairs, October 30, 2006. Available:
http://www.coha.org/cuban-medical-diplomacy-when-the-left-has-got-it-right/
19
Feinsilver, 2006.
20
John Kirk, “Cuba’s Medical Internationalism: Development and Rationale,” Bulletin
of Latin American Research, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2009. Pg. 506.
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grown, the amount of medical assistance this small island nation has provided is
staggering. Since 1961, more than 130,000 Cuban health workers have practiced in
102 countries. As of 2009, there were nearly 37,000 Cuban medical professionals (not
all doctors) working in 73 countries or territories21 (by 2014, this number increased to
50,00022) caring for 70 million patients. This represented more medical personnel
than was fielded at the time by the entire G-8 combined (this being prior to Russia’s
ejection from the group).23
Over the years, Cuba has been heavily involved in alleviating health crises,
offering medical aid to virtually any country where disaster has struck, regardless of
the state of political relations between Cuba and the recipient of aid. In 2005, for
example, Cuba offered to send 1586 medical personnel and 36 tons of medical
supplies to assist New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (assistance the Bush
Administration turned down).24 Predictably, as of October 23 2014, Cuba had fielded
“the largest medical team in west Africa battling Ebola.”25
In addition to sending their own doctors abroad to deal with health crises and
help establish better health systems in other countries, Cuba has done pioneering work
in medical training. Believing education is essential to having a sustainable impact on
the healthcare situation in aid recipient countries, Cuban medical personnel established
medical schools or taught in preexisting medical education institutions in a variety of
21

Connor Gorry, “Cuban Health Cooperation Turns 45,” MEDICC Review, Vol. 10,
No. 3, 2008. Pg. 44-47, available: http://medicc.org/mediccreview/articles/mr_22.pdf
22
Connor Gorry, “Cuba calling: what this small island can teach the world about
disease control,” The Guardian, October 23, 2014. Available:
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2014/oct/23/cuba-healthcare-lessons-ebola-sierra-leone-guinea-liberia
23
Kirk (2009), Pg. 497.
24
Kirk (2009), Pg. 497.
25
Gorry, 2014.
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countries, a process that has continued since the 1970’s.26 In 1998, the Cuban
government established the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM), which is
geared specifically toward training students from poor communities around the world,
including even some Americans per an arrangement reached at the turn of the century
between Fidel Castro and the Congressional Black Caucus (as of 2012, Cuba no
longer planned to accept students from the United States beyond those already
enrolled in the school).27 Every year, ELAM accepts 1,600 new students into their
six-year program, the largest medical school in the world,28 a majority of whom now
are women.29
Performance of ELAM graduates on medical licensing tests in their home
countries, among other things, indicates that the school provides a high quality of
education.30 Indeed, since ELAM students are expected to work in areas that lack
medical supplies and infrastructure, resourcefulness is taught to students at this school
perhaps more than at most other medical institutions. According to American ELAM
students Razel Remen and Lillian Holloway, Cuban professors at ELAM frequently
ask their students questions like “how would you make the diagnosis if you were
working in the middle of the Amazon and did not have access to any diagnostic
tests?”31 Students attend for free in exchange for the promise that they will work in

26

Feinsilver, 2006.
Catherine Porter, “Cuba-trained doctors making difference around the world,” The
Toronto Star, June 2, 2012. Available:
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/06/02/cubatrained_doctors_making_differen
ce_around_the_world.html
28
Porter, 2012.
29
Kirk (2009), Pg. 497, 502.
30
Feinsilver, 2006.
31
Razel Remen and Lillian Holloway, “A Student Perspective on ELAM and its
Educational Program,” Social Medicine, Vol. 3 No. 2, 2008 Pg. 160.
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underserved communities upon graduation. Although this promise is not formal,
about 80 percent follow through32 despite pernicious efforts by at least one U.S. based
NGO to lure ELAM graduates into defection. The extent to which ELAM’s graduates
seem to believe in giving back is exemplified by the hundreds of graduates who
returned to help deal with the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti that killed 300,000 in
2010. Eladio Valcarcel Garcia, one of the ELAM’s founders, proudly recounts that
after so many ELAM alumni from around the world volunteered to assist in Haiti, “we
had to stop calling. All of them said yes.”33 After the initial success of ELAM, Cuban
medical personnel have led in the creation of a second ELAM, a sister school of sorts,
in Venezuela.
Cuba’s medical diplomacy program has been quite effective at improving
bilateral relations with recipient countries and elevated Cuba’s status in the
international community. Countries with poor relations with Cuba have often changed
their tune to some extent after Cuba willingly provided them with medical aid
regardless of diplomatic tensions (as in the case of Guatemala in 1998, when
Guatemala reopened a diplomatic relationship with Cuba after the latter sent them
hundreds of doctors after a devastating hurricane).34 “While it is unclear if medical
internationalism is just a cold analytical move to win ‘symbolic capital’ and political
support for Cuba,” says Kirk, “what is indisputable is the success that Cuba has
enjoyed in international fora.”35 Every year for more than two decades, for example,
the U.N. General Assembly votes overwhelmingly against the American embargo of
32

Porter, 2012.
Porter, 2012.
34
Kirk (2009), Pg. 505.
35
Kirk (2009), Pg. 504.
33
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Cuba (the vote in 2014 was 188-2, Israel being the only country to vote with the
United States), and this year, Latin American countries defied American objections
and invited a Cuban delegation to the Summit of the Americas.36
Cuba’s efforts have had an impact even in the United States. Calls
domestically to end the embargo have even appeared with increasing frequency, as in
the case of this New York Times editorial praising Cuba’s activity vis-à-vis Ebola:
“This should serve as an urgent reminder to the Obama administration that the benefits
of moving swiftly to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba far outweigh the
drawbacks.”37 Even some high-ranking U.S. officials from Secretary of State John
Kerry to U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power have spoken more positively of Cuba
lately in the context of Cuba’s role in fighting Ebola.38 Despite being unable to
singlehandedly repeal the embargo (an action that now requires Congressional
authorization), President Obama, for a variety of reasons, recently moved to restore
full diplomatic relations with Cuba.39
There is evidence also of a commercial benefit to Cuba accruing from their
medical diplomacy program. The degree to which recipients of Cuban aid compensate
Cuba varies based on the ability of recipients to pay. While the rate at which Cuba is
compensated (if paid at all) is well below market value, it is estimated that medical
36

Jon Lee Anderson, “Cuba’s Ebola Diplomacy,” The New Yorker, November 4, 2014.
Available: http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/cubas-ebola-diplomacy
37
The Editorial Board, “Cuba’s Impressive Role on Ebola,” The New York Times,
October 19, 2014. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/opinion/cubasimpressive-role-on-ebola.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=ccolumn-top-span-region&region=c-column-top-span-region&WT.nav=c-column-topspan-region&_r=3
38
Anderson, 2014.
39
Peter Baker, “U.S. To Restore Full Diplomatic Relations With Cuba, Erasing a Last
Trace of Cold War Hostility,” The New York Times, December 17, 2014. Available:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/americas/us-cuba-relations.html?_r=0
19

diplomacy brings Cuba more profit than does their tourism industry.40 Furthermore,
Cuba produces up to about 80 percent of the medicine their doctors use at a fraction of
the cost of what is charged by multinational pharmaceutical companies.41 Although
many of the governments that contract Cuban medical services provide the medical
equipment, the spread of Cuban doctors to so many countries could increase Cuba’s
ability to export medical products. Indeed, although exact sales data is difficult to
come by, Cuba exported medical biotech products to as many as 40 countries as of
2006,42 and has joint ventures with companies in a variety of different countries,
especially in Asia. Cuba’s extensive medical cooperation with Venezuela in particular
has been a boost for Cuba’s economy; it is essentially a direct trade for oil, of which
the small island country is in desperate need.
Although widely hailed as an extremely successful program, Cuba’s medical
internationalism does not operate flawlessly. While not particularly successful, efforts
have been made by forces in the United States to sabotage the program by targeting
Cuban medical personnel directly. The Bush administration took steps to make life
difficult for potential ELAM students and graduates (by restricting travel and other
such measures), and NGO’s like the Miami-based Solidaridad Sin Fronteras
(Solidarity Without Borders, an unsubtle play on “Doctors Without Borders”)
encourage Cuban doctors to defect via a special visa program created by the Bush
administration in 2006.43 Despite editorials occasionally appearing in the United
States positing ill-treatment by Cuba of its medical personnel (one particularly frantic
40

Feinsilver, 2006.
Kirk (2009), Pg. 504.
42
Feinsilver, 2006.
43
Porter, 2012.
41
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op-ed referred to Cuba’s doctors as “slaves in white coats”44), as of 2009, only about
two percent of Cuban medical personnel abroad had chosen to defect, whereas about
nine percent of Canadian medical graduates leave for the United States every year.45
Critics also charge that after failing to spread communism via guns and
guerillas, Castro has switched to ‘doctor diplomacy’, sending medical personnel
abroad to spread ideology. These claims might have some merit if Cuban medical
diplomacy was a recent development, but as the program has existed for half a
century, it can hardly be seen as a pivot. Also, writes Feinsilver, Cuban doctors are
not a fifth column promoting communism; rather they threaten the status quo by
setting a good example of providing medical care in poor areas avoided by local
doctors.46
In this regard, Cuban doctors have sometimes made enemies of local medical
associations and personnel who resent competition from their Cuban counterparts. In
some countries, medical associations have gone on strike protesting the influx of
Cuban personnel. Almost invariably, though, those country’s governments have sided
against their own medical personnel and defended the Cubans. Bolivian President Evo
Morales, for example, promised that the Cubans would stay so long as he continued to
hold office. According to Feinsilver, “the benefits to the host society far outweigh the
costs to the local medical professions,”47 so the governments (and often the citizens)
of host countries accept and appreciate the Cuban medical personnel despite angering
local medical associations. Despite these small issues and setbacks, even many of
44
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Cuba’s avowed critics recognize that Cuban medical diplomacy is producing positive
effects, both for Cuba and for the countries served by their medical personnel.48

China
The first Chinese medical teams arrived in Algeria (like those from Cuba) in
1964 soon after the French withdrew from their former colony. Since then, says Drew
Thompson in China Brief, the People’s Republic has “establish[ed] a relationship
between Chinese doctors and millions of ordinary Africans, and earn[ed] the gratitude
of many African leaders eager to be seen providing public goods to their citizens.”49
Rather than a more central system for distributing doctors, China allocates its doctors
to countries around the world based on which province they are from. According to Li
Anshan, a professor of International Studies at Peking University: “In general,
[Chinese medical teams] are dispatched on the basis of one province per one or more
African country.”50 This, perhaps, could lead to more personalized relationships than
if doctors were sent from all over China; it could also potentially decrease the degree
to which medical diplomacy comes across as centrally controlled propaganda.
Between 1964 when the program began and 2005, China sent more than 15,000
doctors to Africa,51 and the scale of the program has grown since China’s substantially
increased focus on soft power. “Since the beginning of the 21st century,” says Li,
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“China has strengthened its international medical cooperation.”52 Reports in China
differ as to the exact number of countries in which Chinese medical teams are
currently active, but one source put the estimate as high as 65, including some
countries outside of Africa (the lowest estimate was in the mid 40’s).53
Regardless of the specific number of countries to which China sends doctors,
the program is very well received, and is promoted “by both Chinese and African
leaders as a tangible public good.”54 “This long term medical cooperation,” says
Thompson, “builds person-to-person relations between Africans and Chinese, and
brings benefits to both sides."55 The teams are so popular that most African countries
receiving Chinese doctors pay the expenses of medical teams themselves, including
airfares, the stipends of doctors and support staff (Chinese cooks included), and some
of the medical supplies and equipment brought with the team. In the case of the
poorest countries, China covers most of the costs itself.56 “While many countries
offset the costs of paying the expenses and salaries of the medical teams with grants
and loans from China or other donor nations,” Thompson continues, “host nations
repeatedly demonstrate their appreciation by continuing the program and covering the
expenses of the team out of national budgets.” Chinese medical teams frequently
receive national awards in both Africa and China for their contribution.57 In addition
to their work directly with African civilians, Chinese military doctors have deployed
with U.N. peacekeeping operations. Many U.N. soldiers in Africa hail from the
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continent, which allows China also to build good will among Africa’s military class in
the same way that by conducting training operations and deployments with foreign
militaries, the American military builds relationships with the soldiers of other
countries.
Chinese medical aid to Africa goes beyond just the many medical teams
operating on the continent. Recognizing that malaria is the number one killer of
African children under the age of five (causing the death of about a million children
there annually), the Chinese government, says Li, has taken several steps
simultaneously to combat malaria, including medical teams, training programs, free
drugs and facilities and several other projects.58 “In 2002, the Chinese Ministry of
Health conducted a two-part international training course in techniques for the
prevention and treatment of malaria and tropical diseases, in which 30 students from
17 African countries participated.”59 After a summit in 2006, China set up a number
of anti-malaria centers in various African countries where Chinese and African
malaria specialists can exchange ideas and train more medical personnel.60
China does not have an operation like Cuba’s ELAM dedicated to training
foreigners in medicine. China does, though, welcome a fair number of foreign
students into its universities (many of whom will almost certainly go into medicine) in
addition to training medical personnel on the ground in Africa. It is evident by the
launch of their ‘bring-in strategy’ (qing jilai zhanlue) that the People’s Republic
wishes to expand its soft power by encouraging students to attend universities in
China. After these efforts, the number of foreign students in China (while still
58
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significantly lower than in the United States) has dramatically increased—In 2000,
China hosted 52,150 foreign students,61 and by 2011, according to the Institute of
International Education’s Project Atlas, that number reached 292,611.62 While it is
difficult to say exactly what percentage of foreign students in China are studying
medicine, it is fair to assume that a significant number of them are.
The Chinese pharmaceutical industry, which has coordinated with some
African leaders, has also benefited from China’s medical diplomacy program,
specifically the focus on malaria. Claire Provost and Rich Harris claim in The
Guardian that the objectives of Chinese medical teams in Africa have “expanded to
include promotion of China's pharmaceuticals such as antimalarials.”63 According to
Li, “Cotecxin, the most effective anti-malarial drug produced in China, has earned a
great reputation in Africa.”64 This drug has, since 1996, been carried by all of China’s
medical teams, and is often donated by Chinese leaders when they visit the
continent,65 both moves that can be assumed to benefit the industry.
While the Chinese program of medical diplomacy has won the People’s
Republic significant respect among those it has served, it faces some serious issues.
The increase in the number of medical personnel deployed in recent years projects an
image of strength, but despite this recent push, the long-term viability of the program
in its current form, despite its having existed for half a century, is increasingly
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uncertain. The provincial structure of the program is becoming a hindrance as rural
tax reforms have led to shrinking provincial budgets.66 Government doctors in China
are increasingly called upon to address hitherto neglected public health issues in their
own country. Also, as the Chinese healthcare system has become increasingly
privatized, doctors (who supplement their meager government stipend with patient
fees and medicine sales) find less incentive to accept two-year postings abroad where
these private opportunities do not exist. Indeed, in order to meet their obligations to
the countries to which they are linked under the medical diplomacy system, wealthier
provinces where more private opportunities exist “have reportedly been forced to
recruit doctors from inland provinces” to send in place of their own.67 Unless
something changes relatively soon domestically (e.g. the Chinese healthcare system
becomes less privatized, or the provincial structure of the program is altered), this
system of direct health diplomacy could be at serious risk on the home front.
Furthermore, some problems have arisen on the other end of the program, in
the places receiving Chinese medical aid. Rumors have begun to spread in many of
the areas most impacted by malaria of fake drugs being introduced. In Uganda, says
Kathleen McLaughlin through the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, estimates exist
that as much as thirty percent of malaria cures are “either fake, substandard or
counterfeit.”68 News like this undermines China’s attempt to garner soft power with
the citizens of the various African countries in which they provide aid. In spite of

66

Thompson, 2005.
Thompson, 2005.
68
Kathleen McLaughlin, “Kathleen McLaughlin Reports on China’s Problem with
Fake Drugs in Africa,” Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, August 13, 2013.
Available: http://pulitzercenter.org/education/meet-journalist-kathleen-mclaughlinchina-in-africa-uganda-tanzania-bad-drugs-fake-medicine-healthcare-aid
67

26

these recent problems, though, the Chinese program has managed to foster good
relations with a significant number of recipient countries’ governments (even if some
of their citizens are wary of Chinese activity), and treat nearly 200 million patients,
which is no mean feat.69

US DoD Global Health Activity
Operation United Assistance, the American plan to send 3,000 troops to West
Africa to help stem the tide of Ebola in the fall of 2014, was the largest humanitarian
deployment of U.S. forces since the 2004 tsunami that wreaked havoc (killing nearly
300,000 people70) in Southeast Asia,71 and played a significant role in halting the
spread of the virus. In fact, the involvement of the Department of Defense in the fight
against Ebola was inspired partly by a request for aid from Doctors Without Borders.
According to Laurie Garrett in Foreign Policy, “never before had the typically
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pacifist, neutral humanitarian organization asked for military assistance, but the Ebola
epidemic has exhausted MSF's capacities, and compelled radical policies.”72
This high-profile deployment to solely and specifically fight the spread of a
disease caused a significant stir; it was considered a novel and unprecedented idea to
use the military to fight a disease. Some reacted positively, believing this showed the
United States was serious about combatting the disease (the Washington Post said the
deployment “reflects the growing concern of U.S. officials” about the spread of
Ebola73). Others reacted negatively, decrying America’s deployment of soldiers as the
Cubans deployed doctors. A characteristically anti-Western op-ed in Russia Today,
which has come to replace Pravda as the Kremlin’s preferred organ of propaganda,
best sums up the negative attitudes toward the commitment of U.S. troops in its
conclusion that “the difference between a nation whose first response to a natural or
humanitarian disaster is to send doctors and nurses, and a nation whose first response
is to send troops is the difference between civilization and barbarism.”74
While this medical deployment of military units received widespread attention,
it was not the first time the defense department has been used in a healthcare
capacity—in fact, the U.S. military has been directly involved in significant medical
activity for at least a century. Military medical activity historically has fallen (and
continues to fall) into three categories, although the results of work in one area can
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obviously impact the other areas. The first of these categories is force protection,
which involves seeing to the healthcare needs of American military personnel. The
second is threat reduction, or identifying and confronting potential biological threats to
the United States as a whole. The final category is stability operations and partner
engagement, which is the Department of Defense (DoD) healthcare activity most
likely to be a source of soft power along the lines of the Chinese and Cuban programs.
One of the ways in which the military has been most involved in healthcare is
in the form of research, which can fall into all three categories. Several of the most
significant medical breakthroughs of the first half of the twentieth century were
achieved with research conducted by the military. It was the military, say Josh
Michaud, Kellie Moss and Jen Kates in a report for the Kaiser Family Foundation, that
identified mosquitos as the vector by which yellow fever is spread, and the military
that first demonstrated “the potential health benefits of large-scale malaria and yellow
fever prevention campaigns.” DoD-backed research led to the first vaccines for
influenza and Hepatitis A.75 The military continues to be heavily involved in medical
research today, in areas ranging from basic force readiness (done by entities like the
Army’s Military Operational Medicine Research Program76 and the Naval Health
Research Center77) to breast cancer study at Walter Reed.78
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In addition to force protection and broader medical research, the military has
been significantly involved in medical activities in the context of preparing for
biological threats. According to the Kaiser report, “DoD seeks to prevent and prepare
for biological incidents, such as international and domestic infectious disease
outbreaks and epidemics, whether they be due to natural, accidental, or intentional
causes.”79 The significance of the latter two causes has intensified of late in the
context of biologists’ increasing ability to manipulate genetic material in microbes,
which, as I stated in an article for Science Progress, can “be used to create particularly
dangerous pathogens” that could potentially escape a laboratory or be developed for
use in terrorist attacks.80

Historical Overview of Military Medical Outreach
The area of military medical activity that shares the most with the Cuban and
Chinese programs (and the area with the greatest potential to be converted for use in a
soft power capacity) is termed “stability operations and partner engagement” by the
Kaiser report. Although this sort of activity has never been a high institutional
priority, the U.S. military has a long history of healthcare activity that directly affects
foreign populations. During America’s military campaign in the Philippines in the late
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1800’s, for example, “commanders saw strategic value in implementing health
services in local communities in order to foster support for U.S. forces.81
It is difficult to find evidence during the Second World War of an explicit
objective to win over populations via medical activity. After the surrender of the
Axis, however, American military personnel took the lead in rebuilding the devastated
healthcare systems of both Japan and Germany. “The U.S. effort to rebuild Japan’s
public health and health care delivery was quite successful,” says a report by the
RAND Corporation. While the United States did good work in Germany, its
healthcare activities in Japan can be seen as more impressive, since the German
healthcare system prior to the war was one of the most advanced in the world. Japan
had some developed healthcare infrastructure prior to the war including a centrally run
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. This Ministry, however, did not exercise
much local control, which was relegated to prefectural governments, and often
conflicted with the Ministry of Home Affairs, which also had oversight of medical
personnel.82 Due to this and other issues (like inadequate training), the Japanese
healthcare system, even before its infrastructure was largely destroyed in the war, was
“rigidly stratified”; most average Japanese did not see their healthcare improve even
as the number of doctors was increasing.83 Even this progress was stopped in its tracks
by the war, in which one in every four of Japan’s hospitals was destroyed.84
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Following the war, Colonel Crawford Sams, an Army doctor with public
health experience, was most directly responsible for rebuilding Japan’s health system.
Working under the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur,
Colonel Sams focused first on sanitation, nutrition and some immunization with the
goal of preventing the spread of communicable diseases (typhoid and tuberculosis
being the most problematic).85 Although Sams sometimes had to fight Washington for
resources, several of these initial programs were very successful. Children included in
a school lunch program, for example, were an inch taller on average than their peers,
and the program, which was wildly popular among the Japanese citizenry, was
eventually expanded to eight million Japanese children.86
Efforts to contain what were known as “wildfire diseases” – those that could
spread rapidly to epidemic levels – were also largely successful, through vaccination
and sanitation efforts, and vector destruction (e.g. DDT campaigns to kill mosquitos).
Prevalence of diseases like diphtheria, tuberculosis, typhus and others decreased in the
years of American occupation following the war.87 It could be argued that the success
of American military efforts at rebuilding both the Japanese and German healthcare
systems were helped by the existence of health systems prior to the war. What is
undeniable is that despite a preexisting healthcare infrastructure, Japan’s overall health
improved significantly during the period in which the U.S. Military was actively
involved: “The trends in major indicators show,” says the RAND report, “that

Japanand Wartorn Korea, Zabelle Zakarian (ed.) (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).
Pg. 28-29.
85

Jones et. al. (2006), Pg. 54-56.
Sams (1998), Pg. 56, 63.
87
Jones et. al. (2006), 61-63.
86

32

compared with the pre-war levels, the overall Japanese health status improved
significantly during the intervention period.”
Although American military medical personnel almost certainly provided
direct care to civilians at times during the Second World War, the American focus
after the conflict was more on rebuilding the healthcare systems of the defeated Axis
countries on a structural level than it was on individual caregiving of the sort that
could foster a connection between American doctors and foreign patients (though
some American actions like the school lunch program were extremely popular with
Japanese citizens in a way that almost certainly increased American soft power).88
This direct contact was more deliberately institutionalized during the Vietnam War.
“In the late 1960s and early 1970s the military campaign in Vietnam featured a
prominent role for health engagement,” says the Kaiser Family Foundation report.89
One of the primary ways in which this health engagement with the Vietnamese
civilian population was carried out was through medical civic action programs
(MEDCAPs), which are generally short-term assignments (sometimes for training
purposes) undertaken by military medical personnel.
Outside major conflicts, the military has at times deployed medical personnel
as part of other more recovery-based operations. Military units have frequently been
involved in humanitarian aid provision following natural disasters, like an earthquake
in Guatemala in the 1970’s, the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, and a devastating
earthquake in Pakistan in 2005. This has also included some deployments besides
significant natural disasters in the context of post-conflict recovery. During the
88
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1990’s, for instance, American military medical units were deployed to the Balkans
along with other military personnel. In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the military
worked in support of USAID efforts at reconstructing Haiti’s healthcare system. “The
U.S. military helped rebuild hospital and clinic facilities, assisted with rabies control
and prevention efforts, aided with vaccination programs, and helped provide
equipment to health care facilities."90
The recent American military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan add
additional examples of the role played by military medical activity in the context of
counterinsurgency, in some ways similar the aforementioned activity in Vietnam and
the Philippines. According to the RAND report, “counterinsurgency experts have long
argued that winning hearts and minds is a key—if not the key—component in
establishing peace.”91 That such hearts and minds activity is called for in today’s wars
presents somewhat of a problem for the military, says Lawrence Yates in a paper
written for the Army. This is because the military has focused most of its attention on
fighting or preparing for conventional wars, despite the fact that the vast majority of
wars in which the United States have been involved have been smaller unconventional
conflicts (America has fought just eleven “conventional” wars, of which only four
have been total wars, and all of which had some unconventional aspects).92 “One
trade off for this preoccupation with conventional warfare,” Yates continues, “has
been the military’s general disinclination to study and prepare for what, in current
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jargon, is referred to as stability operations.”93
Stability operations, says Yates citing a draft of a military field manual, are
conducted with the goal of establishing and promoting security and control over areas,
and entail using military resources to “establish, safeguard or restore basic civil
services.”94 Although Yates says the military has conducted what would now be
called stability operations for centuries, DoD interest has increased significantly in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks out of the belief that they are important in the context of
preventing terrorism. According to the 2002 National Security Strategy cited by the
Kaiser Family Foundation report, “The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that
weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as
strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet
poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist
networks.”95
The RAND Corporation report argues for the importance of healthcare system
promotion in contexts like Iraq and Afghanistan, declaring: “nation-building efforts
cannot be successful unless adequate attention is paid to health.”96 The report’s
authors posit a direct link between health and security in a hearts and minds context:
Health can have an important effect—positive or negative—on
security. In Japan [in the aftermath of the Second World War], the
introduction of powdered milk into schools created a reservoir of good
will that contributed to a benign security environment. In Iraq,
however, there is evidence that poor health conditions—especially poor
sanitation conditions—contributed to anti-Americanism and support for
93
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the insurgency.97
The Taliban also appears to have grasped the value of healthcare provision as a means
of securing local support. According to an article in Defense Horizons by Colonel
Donald Thompson, an Air Force flight surgeon: “Insurgents have provided medical
services to win over the rural population; Taliban-owned hospitals operate in Pakistan
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and provide medical services to Afghans in the
region.”98

Problems with the Military’s Recent Healthcare Outreach Activities

The DoD’s increased attention to stability operations is a good thing, but many
of the flaws that have traditionally plagued its healthcare outreach activity (like low
prioritization and lack of coordination) continue to persist, and will need to be
rectified if the military is to become a serious engine of medical diplomacy. Although
some minimal steps have been taken to unify the bureaucracy that underpins U.S.
military medical activity, this activity remains disorganized, lacking a clear source of
central authority; there does not appear to be an explicit medical outreach program as
such. This often undermines the effectiveness on the ground of military medical
outreach, blunting its potential diplomatic impact. This disorganization includes
difficulty coordinating between different parts of the government and with NGO’s that
often take the lead in global health activity.
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In addition to technical issues that undermine the DoD’s ability to conduct
medical diplomacy, some deliberate policy decisions about DoD medical activity
create public relations problems that blunt the diplomatic impact of medical outreach.
Although the Military Health System has extensive resources at its disposal to care for
American military personnel abroad, it is often hesitant to extend the same care to
patients outside the U.S. military. This, and the frequently-employed rule that the
medical corps provide locals medical attention only up to the local standard of care
(although the reasons for this are many, complicated, and sometimes well-justified in
certain contexts), does not project the image of benevolent American generosity that
would improve American soft power. Medical outreach has also sometimes been
undermined by a failure to understand local culture, which can degrade both the ability
to practice medicine effectively and to garner soft power. Even if most of these issues
were addressed, the short periods during which military medical teams are usually
deployed does not often afford enough time for those teams to make a serious
diplomatic impact.
The first of several flaws with America’s medical stability operations is
significant disorganization in the bureaucracy behind them. While the DoD is
engaged in significant medical activity, these efforts have not been undertaken
intentionally with any particular goal in mind—there is no actual program. “Myriad
DoD programs have an impact on global health, but each has different and sometimes
conflicting objectives,” say Eugene V. Bonventre, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Stacy M.
Okutani in a report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies.99 According
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to the Kaiser Foundation study, some steps have been taken to organize DoD medical
outreach bureaucracy, but as of 2012, “there is no overarching policy or strategic
document that guides the Department [of Defense]’s global health related efforts.”100
In 2011, says Daniel, the DoD created the position of “DoD global health engagement
coordinator,” a military position in an office “under the undersecretary of defense for
policy” (for the sake of comparison, Cuba’s program is run by a Deputy Minister of
Foreign Relations).101 While this laid the groundwork for increased coordination
within the military vis-à-vis health efforts, this alone will not turn existing military
medical activity into a serious conductor of health diplomacy. Both the Chinese and
Cuban programs are organized around ideas of improving global health and gaining
soft power, but America’s programs look more like ad hoc, whack-a-mole efforts at
maintaining a standard of healthcare in areas effectively controlled by the U.S.
military in the wake of an armed intervention.
This internal disorganization has undermined efforts at post-conflict
stabilization even in countries where the military is heavily focused, says Colonel
Thompson. “Interagency coordination defects… have plagued the United States in its
broader approach to post-conflict stabilization efforts.”102 In the context of a war, one
department of the American government is expected to take primary responsibility
while the others work in a support capacity (during the fighting the Defense
Department takes the lead, during the post-conflict negotiations the State Department
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takes on the primary role). This makes sense in a conventional war, but in an
insurgency situation (of the sort where stability operations would be the most
effective), this method of coordination falls apart in the face of security persistent
threats and hearts and minds issues.103
The flaws inherent in this strategy have been particularly clear in Operation
Enduring Freedom. “Nowhere is this disorganization more apparent, nor have more
opportunities been lost, than in the areas of health and medical care in Afghanistan”,
where “poor resource support and central coordination for local efforts are hampering
the local and regional counterinsurgency impact of” NATO Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs).104 One of the highest-ranking American military medical personnel in
Afghanistan during 2006 and 2007, Thompson goes on to describe one instance where
it took months of negotiation to assign two technical experts from the U.S. Public
Health Service Commissioned Corps (under the Department of Health and Human
Services) to the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (under the
Department of Defense). These technical experts had extensive experience in
communicable disease control, food and drug safety, and “development of basic health
services across cultural barriers” – all skills that would have been highly valuable to
the health mission in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that these DHHS employees had
worked across a variety of federal departments domestically, it took a full 18 months
before their expertise could be brought to bear by the DoD due to a bureaucratic
technicality about working abroad.105
In addition to interagency coordination issues, efforts are sometimes hampered
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by the complexity and difficulty of receiving funding for development-related
missions; it is often difficult for projects to obtain financial support when Congress
has not specifically allocated money. “The complexity of the Federal Acquisitions
Regulations (FAR) often results in missed opportunities to act quickly in restoring
essential services,” say Merriam Mashatt, Major General Daniel Long and James
Crum in a report for the U.S. Institute of Peace.106 In his article, Colonel Thompson
describes one such missed opportunity. In the Kunar province, Taliban militants
maimed locals who assisted the NATO PRT’s in an effort to undermine
counterinsurgency development efforts. When the PRT commander sought funding to
provide the victims with reconstructive surgery in a hospital in Kabul operated by
CARE international (a healthcare NGO), that funding was denied by the U.S. Central
Command Humanitarian Assistance coordinator. The mere $430,000 required would
have paid to train two Afghan plastic surgeons per year and provide reconstructive
surgery to 30 patients in the same period of time. “Funding this initiative,” says
Thompson, “would have been a relatively inexpensive way to show U.S. support for
local populations, would have helped boost local morale, and would have built needed,
sustainable capacity in the Afghan health sector.” Even when funding does come
through, red tape surrounding its allocation could potentially dull the impact of
projects by delaying the arrival of financial support. The Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and the CDC, for example, worked together to assist Uganda and Vietnam in
developing health capabilities necessary to meet the requirements of the 2005
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International Health Regulations. According to J. Christopher Daniel in a Center for
Strategic and International Studies report, “the partnership has helped lay the
foundation for the Global Health Security Agenda, launched in February 2014.” This
success occurred, though, “despite challenges related to interagency money
transfers.”107 The same report calls on Congress to facilitate easier and more flexible
mechanisms for this sort of operation.108
In addition to problems coordinating coexisting U.S. government efforts at
health outreach, the DoD has suffered problems operating alongside various outside
organizations providing healthcare. In situations where multiple organizations are
trying to provide services to the same population, it is often helpful when one
particular group is declared the “lead actor,” and, according to the RAND Corporation
report, “It can be difficult to agree on a lead actor, since donor states, international
institutions, and NGOs generally have different priorities, interests, and strategies.”109
While American military medical forces cooperated well with NGO’s in their efforts
at rebuilding the healthcare systems in Japan and Germany, the international system of
healthcare NGO’s was far less developed; there were fewer metaphorical strings to be
tangled than there are today. When the military deployed doctors to Haiti alongside
aid workers from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
“one of the challenges the international relief community faced was how to integrate
the efforts of U.S. military medical units into the larger humanitarian relief and
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rebuilding efforts,” according to the RAND Corporation report. The language of that
statement implies that, unlike the successful postwar reconstructions led by the armed
forces in the 1940’s, the military may be less effective in a relief effort where it is not
the lead actor.
Even in recent situations where the military is clearly in charge, though, the
difficult task of coordinating with the larger numbers of actors that are now relevant
has complicated the development efforts of the DoD. During the rebuilding of Iraq’s
healthcare system, say doctors David Tarantino and Shakir Jawad, there was “a critical
need for improved coordination across the DoD, USG, host nation, coalition, IO, and
NGO leadership.”110 Due to the similar lack of cooperation in Afghanistan, Dr.
Thompson called for the establishment of a health sector reconstruction office that
would “integrate and unify nationwide planning and implementation with the
government of Afghanistan, representatives of other nations, and international
organizations and NGOs.”111
Poor communication between NGO’s and the military has sometimes resulted
in the alienation of healthcare NGO’s working in conflict zones. According to the
Kaiser Foundation report, “In certain circumstances, such as Afghanistan and Iraq,
NGOs have at times expressed reluctance or refused to work with DoD, because they
believe doing so negatively impacts their ability to carry out their work and increases
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risks to their staff and programs in the field.”112 Better communication, the report
continues, could clarify “expectations, roles and other issues.” Another impediment to
coordination between the military and healthcare NGO’s has been reluctance on the
part of the military to share information. “The U.S. Military at times “over-classified”
information contained in health assessments such as the locations of hospitals and
clinics, and other health sector information, making it impossible to share this
information with NGO’s,” say Tarantino and Jawad.113
Presenting a less directly administrative issue, providing care to anyone other
than Americans is often a low priority for U.S. Military medical units stationed
abroad. According to the RAND report, this was on full display during the U.S.
Military’s medical mission to Kosovo during the 1990’s, and thrown into particularly
sharp relief when compared to America’s more medically generous allies in the effort:
Countries with a long history of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief
missions, such as Norway and Canada, tended to define their medical
mission more broadly. In particular, this included involvement with the
host country and the local community in providing direct medical care,
as well as undertaking public health activities and helping rebuild the
health sector infrastructure. U.S. policy tended to favor a narrower
definition of the medical mission, one that focused on providing
medical support to the force and provided care to civilians only in
emergencies. According to U.S. policy, military medical units were not
to get involved in refugee care or in rebuilding the health care
infrastructure.114
This policy of strongly prioritizing the health of American soldiers (even when
they are not particularly at risk) was also in place when the military medical
corps assisted USAID with their efforts in Haiti. “The U.S. military’s policy
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was to transfer civilian patients to local hospitals as soon as possible.”115 Even
in Operation United Assistance, the DoD’s mission to combat Ebola, U.S.
military personnel “rarely left their bases.” 116 “The army’s battle against
Ebola,” says VICE news, did not look like a war. Helicopters flew no dead
bodies or Ebola patients, or even blood samples. Combat medics treated no
sick people. Soldiers didn't rescue victims from streets, or enforce quarantines,
or provide armed security against mobs crazed by fear and illness.”117 That
American troops worked in relative isolation building facilities that would be
used in the future to treat Ebola patients certainly kept U.S. forces safer (while
still helping to an extent to combat the disease) but prevented the sort of
human contact that would likely have done more to garner soft power.
The fact that the primary mission of the Military Health System is
usually considered to be force protection (caring for American troops) creates a
rationale for saving military medical resources for use on Americans in the
unlikely event that those medical resources would be tapped out. A different
report also published by RAND even decried a tendency of military doctors to
be too generous with foreigners if explicit rules for medical resource allocation
were not set prior to the mission. “Without clear guidelines for giving or
withholding care,” said this earlier report, “medical providers will tend to react
to the immediate need, regardless of the long-term consequences for
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readiness.”118 While this attitude makes sense in the context of the military
preparedness issues, it is detrimental to the military’s ability to garner soft
power through medical outreach.
Another military policy that impedes potential DoD medical diplomatic
activity requires that a resident of an area where the military is deployed should
receive medical attention only up to the local standard of care. There are legitimate
rationales for this policy in several military contexts. In a situation where the military
has other non-diplomatic objectives, efforts to achieve these objectives could be
significant impeded by local populations seeking medical services from military
personnel whose focus is on a different goal. Thus, maintaining a policy of providing
only the local standard of care prevents a potentially significant distraction from
affecting the ability of U.S. military personnel to carry out the mission at hand.
Refusing to systematically provide medical attention above the local standard
of care also makes strategic sense in the context of a stability operation where the
objective is to increase the credibility of local institutions. The goal of stability
operations is indeed frequently to increase the legitimacy of the local government;
providing care that goes beyond what the local government can achieve could serve to
undermine that government. According to Bonventre, Hicks, and Okutani, for
example, in 2004 after the Banda Aceh tsunami, the Indonesian government
complained that healthcare delivered by the U.S. Navy hospital ship Mercy had
“undermined its legitimacy and authority” since “the standard of care delivered far
118
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exceeded what the Indonesian government was able to provide after the ship
departed.”119 This highlights the need for coordination with the local government in
the context of a medical diplomacy situation, unless good relations with the local
government are not considered a priority. The Indonesia scenario also indicates the
benefit of American medical personnel potentially remaining in an area for longer than
just the time it takes to clean up after a natural disaster.
The high premium placed on military readiness (to which the second RAND
report alludes) is another oft-cited reason for rationing military medical resources. In
some situations, though, this rationale rings hollow, and it certainly is not helpful
diplomatically. In Haiti, for example, the motivation behind the policy of transferring
Haitian patients as quickly as possible to local hospitals was “to free up inpatient
capacity in the event of a surge in demand—especially U.S. military casualties.”120
While it makes sense to preserve military readiness and force protection is and should
obviously remain a key priority of the Military Health System, it was deeply
improbable that a military medical unit would be called upon to care for large numbers
of American soldiers in the context of a development operation in Haiti coordinated
primarily by USAID. That being the case, those looking in from the outside could
view the stockpiling of medical resources that are then not used to help people in
immediate need negatively, undermining potential diplomatic benefit of the mission.
This was indeed the case in Kosovo, where the actions of America’s more medically
generous allies cast a poor light on the U.S. military’s unwillingness to use their
medical resources more extensively.
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Differences in coalition partners’ medical policies created unrealistic
expectations of the U.S. medical units and complicated interactions
with government officials, the health NGO’s, and civilian healthcare
providers and civilians. Local officials, health NGO’s and some
coalition partners criticized the United States for not allowing U.S.
medical units to get more involved in healthcare delivery and in
healthcare reconstruction efforts.121
The impression that the Military Health System is a fancy car that the U.S. is
unwilling to let out of the proverbial garage will surely not contribute to soft power via
medical diplomacy—if the military is to conduct more effective health outreach,
policies restricting the extent to which military doctors are allowed to help the local
populace should be loosened.
Another key to conducting good medical diplomacy operations is the
ability to conform to or at least be aware of local culture as it pertains to health
issues. There are, of course, times when a medical mission must ignore or
even combat local customs that effect medical practice. Female genital
mutilation – widespread in parts of Africa and much of the Muslim world –
comes to mind. Whether or not certain local traditions deserve respect,
awareness of them is essential to both the acquisition of soft power and to good
medical practice. A key part of the mission to combat Ebola in West Africa
was convincing locals to abandon traditional burial rites that involved, says
Science magazine, “washing, touching and kissing the body” (which, in the
case of Ebola, remains highly infectious after death).122 According to VICE
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News, “it took months to convince the majority of families to cease handling
dead bodies.”123 Awareness of this local practice, though, allowed it to be
identified early on by epidemiologists as a significant driver of transmission,
which in turn allowed medical professionals to push safer burial practices that
decreased transmission of the virus.
While sound knowledge of local traditions has helped halt the spread of
Ebola in West Africa, military medical outreach efforts have sometimes been
plagued by clumsy mistakes driven by a lack of attention to local culture. In
one case Daniels describes in his report for the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, “DoD conducted a medical clinic in a remote village of
Djibouti, but only three days’ notice to the predominantly nomadic villagers
resulted in minimal participation.”124 Military medical operations have
frequently suffered from a poor cultural understanding of the people the
operation exists to serve. “Efforts to provide humanitarian medical assistance
after a major 1976 earthquake in Guatemala were hindered by the inability of
U.S. military personnel to adapt to local customs,” say doctors Bradley Boetig
and George Avery in World Medical & Health Policy.125 According to
Tarantino and Jawad, Military medical operations in Iraq also suffered from a
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“lack of understanding of the cultural context.”126 In their report, Tarantino
and Jawad call on the U.S. Government to “expand and improve education,
training and career development opportunities in the areas of civil-military
medicine, medical stability operations, and public health and health care
delivery in international and conflict settings.”127 Given the military’s history
of missteps vis-à-vis local culture, the DoD should provide “opportunities to
increase cultural awareness and intelligence.”128
The diplomatic impact of military medical outreach has sometimes been
dampened when poorly conceived and coordinated health operations have had a
negative impact on local civilian populations. Many countries, whether intentionally
or not, create a multitiered healthcare system in which the superior military health
system is accessible to the dependents of military personnel and political dignitaries.
This, understandably, leads to resentment amongst those relegated to the often
underfunded and under equipped civilian healthcare system. “The United States,”
Thompson argues, “is developing such a disparate system in Afghanistan by putting
almost all of its health sector reconstruction resources into the security sector while
ignoring the civilian sector.”129 While maintaining good relations with foreign
militaries has historically been a high priority of the DoD, it pays to avoid doing so at
the cost of alienating foreign civilians.
In addition to potentially disenfranchising certain populations if they are
excluded from receiving care, medical diplomacy runs the risk of triggering a backlash
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from local medical professionals. These personnel could feel undercut by an influx of
foreign doctors who sometimes provide better care more cheaply than the local
doctors, damaging the reputation and bottom line of those local medical practitioners.
Cuban medical personnel on mission have often been met with hostility from local
medical associations, says Julie Feinsilver. Doctors in some countries serviced by the
Cubans have gone on strike in protest, others have attempted legal action or taken their
complaints to the press.130 After initially being essential to recovery after a
devastating earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, American medical personnel became an
object of resentment for Pakistani doctors who, say Boetig and Avery, “could not
compete with U.S. units providing a higher standard of care for no cost.”131 Boetig
and Avery argue that the damage done to the local healthcare system in this particular
case hurt America’s image with some Pakistanis. While it is possible that the locals in
this situation were especially quick to vilify Americans due to other political realities,
this instance, similar issues in Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami,132 and the
backlash sometimes faced by Cuban doctors, highlights the importance of
understanding the local medical situation. Medical diplomacy or stability operations
cannot be conducted with the assumption that one-size-fits-all; they must be calibrated
to the unique realities and needs of the area being served.
Operations must also identify at whom the “diplomacy” part of medical
diplomacy is targeted. Cuban medical outreach is obviously not conducted with the
aim of winning favor amongst the medical personnel of the countries they serve, it is
conducted to win over the governments and populations of those countries. Cuba has
130
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calculated that the diplomatic benefit of their medical operations is worth the cost of
alienating some local medical practitioners, a calculation that appears to be correct:
“despite protests (and strikes),” says Feinsilver, “numerous press and other reports
from different countries extol the benefits to the patients,” whose governments often
take notice. The administrations in most countries served by Cuban doctors have
repeatedly ignored the protests of local medical personnel, since the overall benefit to
society significantly outstrips the cost to local medical practitioners.133 That Cuban
medical diplomacy is generally well received by the populations and governments in
most of the countries they serve – even at the expense of angering local doctors – is
indication that American doctors abroad could have the same effect despite the
problems with the medical operation in Pakistan in 2005.
One of the issues that undermined the medical mission in Pakistan has
negatively impacted other American medical outreach: medical personnel were
deployed long enough to displace (and thus draw the ire of) local medical personnel,
but not long enough to effectively replace them. The very temporary nature that
characterizes U.S. military medical outreach sometimes undermines its potential to
garner soft power via medical diplomacy. One way of conducting medical diplomacy
in a more lasting way, suggests Major Bradley Boetig in Military Medicine, is through
institutional relationships rather than just ad hoc assignments. Boetig calls for the
establishment “of enduring, bilateral relationships between U.S. and host-national
medical institutions,”134 of the sort that are conspicuously more present in the Chinese
133
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and Cuban programs, which contain much more extensive cooperation with and
training of foreign medical personnel. Institutional (rather than purely individual)
partnerships, Boetig believes, “would cultivate relationships that endure beyond the
length of the individual assignment cycle.”135
Much as the U.S. military’s patient-centered health outreach is basically
limited to brief, ad hoc missions, often in response to some crisis, the rare occasions
where military medical personnel work with non-American medical personnel are
frequently limited to just a few weeks. While military Medical Readiness Training
Exercises (MEDRETE’s) that involve foreign personnel are often considered
successful based on the number of “relationships established,” this model does not
result in a very permanent connection, since “those relationships are almost always
fleeting… as individuals move in and out of units quite frequently; and rarely do
units—let alone individuals return repeatedly to the same location.”136 Compare this
to the Chinese system, where doctors usually deploy for two years at a time, and
specific Chinese provinces are paired with individual foreign countries, ensuring a
more consistent long-term relationship,137 or the Cuban system, where doctors also
deploy for long periods and significant numbers of medical students are exchanged for
the entire duration of their medical training.
The obstacles preventing the military from conducting effective health
outreach are not insurmountable, but they are many, they are varied, and they require
attention if the DoD is to become an entity that can successfully conduct medical
diplomacy in a way that will garner soft power for the United States. The following
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recommendations are one way in which some of these issues could potentially be
addressed.

Recommendations
•

The Department of Defense should expand medical outreach, and conduct
some of these medical outreach activities specifically under the guise of
military medical diplomacy, rather than just stability operations. Changing the
name of something can change its fundamental meaning; military medical
personnel carrying out missions in this context would likely be more mindful
of diplomatic objectives if diplomacy were the stated goal.

•

Appoint a single coordinator of all DoD medical operations, with sub-positions
as necessary. Personnel beneath these positions should be easily transferable
(including cutting through red tape in dealing with other executive
departments) in order to avoid the sorts of coordination issues that have
sometimes plagued military medical operations (like the eighteen months
required to transfer the three technical experts to Afghanistan during Operation
Enduring Freedom).138

•

Improve coordination with bodies outside the DoD so that U.S. military
medical personnel can better play a role in health operations that are not under
the complete (or any) control of the U.S. military. In the context of USAID
operations where U.S. military personnel are involved, for example, military
personnel could be allowed greater flexibility in their orders in a way that
would allow them to get more directly involved with the aid mission rather
than just waiting for potential American casualties.
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•

Congress should expand and help streamline funding for health outreach
operations, allowing greater flexibility and authority for military medical
personnel on the ground.

•

Push back against the idea that foreign patients are less important, at least in
the context of a medical diplomacy operation (this could be done through
changes in training or doctrine). The appearance that American forces
disregard foreign patients undermines American soft power, especially in
situations where U.S. forces are deployed alongside personnel from other
countries who may appear more generous. Except in situations where there
could plausibly be an influx of American personnel needing care, U.S. military
resources should not be hoarded in service to force readiness. Doing so is
unnecessary (we are not going to run out of Band-Aid’s anytime soon, and if
we do, we can easily afford more unless the military budget is significantly
cut), and projects a negative image of the U.S. military and America as a
whole.

•

Carefully address the question of local standard of care. In situations where
soft power can be gained without undermining local institutions (or in
situations where preserving local institutions is not a high priority), U.S.
military medical should provide the best care they can; taking better care of
someone than local resources allow projects a good image of the United States.
In situations where going above the local standard of care would undermine
local institutions in a way that could seriously harm either America’s soft
power or the people American personnel are deployed to serve, medical
personnel should do their best to adhere to the local standard of care, with the
hope that the presence of American military medical resources could help
increase the standard of care over time.

•

U.S. military medical personnel should receive more training on the cultures
and traditions of the places to which they deploy. Failure to understand local
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culture as it pertains to medicine has undermined U.S. military medical
outreach in more than one instance, whereas a proper understanding of local
culture was essential to the fight against Ebola in the summer and fall of 2014.

•

Deployment of U.S. military medical personnel should be long enough to
ensure that they actually have a diplomatic and medical impact—brief
deployments are better than none, longer deployments are better than brief
ones.

•

Longer deployments could sometimes take the form of bilateral exchanges
between existing medical institutions (like military hospitals or the Uniform
Service University). Boetig proposes a longer-term bilateral exchange of
medical personnel in order to “truly acquire the much-hyped ‘cultural
competency’ skills that have to be earned by actually cultivating a partnership
that endures beyond a 2-week MEDRETE.”139 A partnership such as this
would be beneficial for the host institution, whose credibility would likely
increase with the implicit vote of confidence from the U.S. as indicated by the
presence of American military medical personnel. Additionally, established
institutional partnerships would improve the readiness of medical
subspecialists, since “there is no better way to maintain their skills than to
provide our specialists with the opportunity to consult routinely on the more
challenging cases that arise at partner military hospitals overseas.”140

•

The Uniform Services University of Health Sciences should expand
opportunities for foreign students to take courses there even if they did not
graduate from an undergraduate institution in the United States (international
students are currently admitted only if they went to college in America).141
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These recommendations alone will not turn the U.S. military medical corps into a
health diplomacy program on the order of the Cuban or Chinese models—nor should
that necessarily be a goal. The U.S. Military Health System, though, is a significant
untapped soft power resource that, with some changes, could save lives and bolster
America’s image abroad.
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